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Abstract Nowadays many organizations experience security incidents due to unau-
thorized access to information. To reduce the risk of such incidents, security policies
are often employed to regulate access to information. Such policies, however, are often
too restrictive, and users do not have the rights necessary to perform assigned duties.
As a consequence, access control mechanisms are perceived by users as a barrier and
thus bypassed, making the system insecure. In this paper we draw a bridge between
the social concept of conviviality and access control. Conviviality has been introduced
as a social science concept for ambient intelligence and multi-agent systems to high-
light soft qualitative requirements like user-friendliness of systems. To bridge the gap
between conviviality and security, we propose a methodological framework for updat-
ing and adapting access control policies based on conviviality recommendations. Our
methodology integrates and extends existing techniques to assist system designers in
the derivation of access control policies from socio-technical requirements of the system,
while taking into account the conviviality of the system. We illustrate our framework
using the Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) use case from the HotCity of Luxembourg.
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Building a secure socio-technical system requires the deployment of appropriate secu-
rity mechanisms [49]. To avoid security incidents due to an unauthorized access, data
and IT resources are usually protected by means of access control policies. Access con-
trol policies are often defined on the basis of the least privilege principle. According to
this principle, users should only be able to access the minimum amount of information
necessary to accomplish their duties [60]. However, to minimize the risk of unautho-
rized access, policy designers tend to define policies which are even more restrictive
than what is recommended by the least privilege principle. Thereby, access control is
often perceived by users as a barrier, an unacceptable limitation. Worse, this barrier
is considered as an obstacle that should be bypassed.
There are several real-life examples that show how users try to bypass security
mechanisms (including the access control mechanism) that interfere and cause incon-
veniences [64]. For instance, the employees of a company can give their credentials
to consultants in order to allow them access to specific applications. This behavior
is clearly against the access control policy and even increases the risks of security
breaches, since the sharing of credentials does not make it possible to trace the access
to the users who actually accessed a certain application. Moreover, this behavior can
lead to several other security problems, such as role usurpation. Thus, the aspiration
to make the system more secure actually makes the system more insecure. As stated
by Sinclair and Smith [69], security tends to ignore such “real-world subtleties”.
Real-world subtleties encompass social dimensions of socio-technical systems, such
as the usability [5] and conviviality [40] of the system. These human factors should
be taken into account from the early phases of the development of socio-technical sys-
tems. Several lines of research (e.g., [2,11,32,33,38,61]) have explored the problem of
designing socio-technical systems aiming to achieve trade-offs between usability and
security. However, there are other social dimensions of socio-technical systems which
may conflict with security. In this paper, we study the trade-off between security and
conviviality. Conviviality is a concept from the social sciences defined by Illich as “in-
dividual freedom realized in personal interdependence” [40]. Clearly, a tension exists
between conviviality and security: too much security threatens conviviality, while being
convivial is a potential threat to confidentiality and privacy. Such trade-off/potential
conflicts should be identified and managed as soon as possible, at requirement level
and early design stages. Producing a security policy model that is non-conflictual with
conviviality expectations is desirable, since it encourages actors to respect the security
policy being used.
These initial considerations raise the main research question addressed in this pa-
per: How to manage the two different orthogonal concerns of security and conviviality
in the elaboration of system operational requirements and design models?
The main contribution of the paper is in (1) bridging the gap between two concepts
that are rarely brought together, i.e., security and conviviality, which are often consid-
ered opposite domains of Social Sciences and Informatics, by defining a socio-technical
mapping that bridges the gap between conviviality and access control; (2) handling
access control policy update on the basis of conviviality recommendations.
The paper studies how to enable a symbiotic elaboration of a security policy to-
gether with a conviviality model, so that the potential conflicts between these two
viewpoints can be detected and solved. Starting from initial operational requirements,
the approach makes the trade-off explicit, and results in a representation of convivial-
3ity consistent with the security policy (that can be updated during the process). The
approach does not intend to weave or compose these viewpoints [58,56]; rather, it pro-
duces two consistent models, one for security and one for conviviality. On the one hand,
the security model, in the hand of security officers, describes the security policy to be
enforced; on the other hand, the conviviality model, in the hand of business experts,
is a formal tool for reasoning and improving this social dimension of a system.
To recombine these two viewpoints, we propose the DN-AC alignment methodology
which allows the specification of access control policies compatible with a conviviality-
driven specification of a system. Increasing conviviality while keeping a system secure
raises the question of how to adapt an access control policy while increasing the convivi-
ality of the system. Thus, our main research question breaks down into the following
subquestions:
1. How to model access control policies to make explicit its adaptable parts?
2. How to model conviviality from an initial use case scenario?
3. How to update and adapt access control according to conviviality improvements?
The DN-AC methodology uses the SI* modeling language [36,50] to capture the
socio-technical requirements of a system, in particular security and conviviality re-
quirements, and to generate the access control policy from requirements models [51].
To address question (1), we differentiate non-negotiable authorizations from negotiable
authorizations: negotiable authorizations correspond to the adaptable parts of the pol-
icy, whereas non-negotiable authorizations correspond to socio-technical requirements
that must be implemented in the system. To address question (2), abstracting from
method-specific concepts such as plans and actions, we create a dependence network
from the SI* model. Dependence networks [23,67] offer an efficient model for represent-
ing interdependencies among agents. Dependence networks are labeled directed graphs
where the nodes are agents, and each labeled edge represents that the former agent
depends on the latter one to achieve some goal. The focus on dependence networks
and more specifically on their cycles, is a reasonable way of formalizing conviviality as
something related to the freedom of choice of individuals together with the subsidiary
relations – interdependence for task achievement – among fellow members of a social
system. Intuitively, more opportunity to work with other people increases the convivi-
ality in the system. The analysis of the dependence network could lead to an increase
in the number of potential coalitions in the dependence network, and hence increase
the conviviality of the system. This process allows us to address question (3).
Our motivation is to address the challenge of finding trade-offs between access
control policy and conviviality, particularly as they pertain to the Ambient Assistant
Living (AAL) domain emphasized by our partner, Luxembourg HotCity. We thus aim
to provide guidelines to assist system designers to improve many aspects of daily life of
Luxembourg citizens which are illustrated through our different case studies. Nonethe-
less, our approach is general and can be applied to other application domains in which
conviviality is an important requirement.
The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we introduce our methodology in
Section 2 and our use cases in Section 3. We then present the building blocks of the
methodology: requirements modeling with SI* in Section 4, access control policy in
Section 5, and dependence networks in Section 6. In Section 7, we propose a mapping
between access control policies and dependence networks along with the policy updat-
ing/adapting process. In Section 8, we validate our approach through the scenarios of
the Ambient Assisted Living (AAL) from the HotCity of Luxembourg. Finally, we dis-
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cuss related work in Section 9, and conclude the paper providing directions for future
work in Section 10.
2 DN-AC Alignment Methodology
This section presents a methodological framework for generating conviviality-driven
access control policies from socio-technical requirements. The aim of the methodology
is to find a trade-off between security, more specifically access control constraints, and
conviviality. This trade-off makes it possible to consider new dependencies between
agents, while the system remains secure. Figure 1 illustrates the overall process.
First, the security and functional requirements of the system are elicited and repre-
sented in a requirements model using a goal-oriented framework [36,50]. The require-
ment model captures stakeholders and system actors together with their goals, the
tasks to achieve those goals, required resources, and the security and functional depen-
dencies among them. The requirements model is formally analyzed against a number
of security properties to verify whether requirements have been specified correctly. If
the model satisfies these properties, it is used to determine the authorization rules
which are necessary to protect the system (left side of Figure 1) and to analyze the
conviviality of the system (right side of Figure 1).
An access control policy is a set of authorization rules that specify the conditions
under which users are authorized/denied to access the protected data or resources.
Positive authorization rules refer to permissions to access resources, while negative au-
thorization rules refer to prohibitions to access resources. In this paper, we distinguish
between negotiable and non-negotiable authorization rules. Non-negotiable authoriza-
tion rules correspond to hard requirements, i.e. requirements that must be fulfilled
to guarantee the security of the system and, therefore, they cannot be modified; on
the other hand, negotiable authorization rules correspond to the adaptable part of the
access control policy and can be modified, for instance, to increase the conviviality of
the system. For the specification of the access control policy, we use a model-driven
approach based on [51]. In particular, the access control policy is derived by analyzing
the duties and responsibilities assigned to stakeholders and system actors.
5In parallel and independently from the specification of access control policy, de-
pendence networks are created from the requirements model and used to reason about
the potential ameliorations to increase the global conviviality of the system. Differ-
ent techniques for improving conviviality have been proposed in the literature [9,15],
for example by changing the agents within the system, by changing the dependencies
among them, by introducing or changing normative dependencies, and by changing
the composition of the coalitions. In this paper, we increase the number of coalitions
between agents by adding/removing dependencies between agents.
The analysis of the dependence network may suggest some potential dependen-
cies between agents to increase the conviviality of the system. Furthermore, feedback
gathered from users, for example through comments or direct input, may be used as
additional information to represent users dependencies among each other in the depen-
dence networks. Such dependencies may also impact resource sharing between agents,
and thus the authorization rules should be updated accordingly.
The final step of the process aims to reconcile the security and conviviality view-
points in order to generate “secure and convivial” system. This step involves a socio-
technical mapping between the access control policy and the dependence network (re-
ferred to as DN-AC mapping in Figure 1). The mapping relates each goal of the de-
pendence network to the corresponding authorization rules. If the authorization rules
are negotiable, they may be changed in order to increase the system conviviality; oth-
erwise, if the authorization rules are non-negotiable, the corresponding ameliorations
are discarded. Indeed, the revised policy should not violate the security requirements
of the system.
3 Use Case Scenario
We have considered 12 use case scenarios that have been elaborated and validated
together with the HotCity Ambient Assistant Living (AAL) of Luxembourg. The sce-
narios illustrate how a Home Care System (HCS) could improve its users’ quality of
life in a variety of cases and cover different areas and problems related to AAL like
health problems (Heart-attack, Fever, Medication, Alzheimer), psychological or social
problems (Loneliness, Isolation, Depression, Alcoholism) and economical problems (Fi-
nances). A complete description and analysis of these scenarios can be found in [71]
where the scenarios are represented graphically using dependence networks (DN). The
access control policies that could be applied to these scenarios to guarantee the security
of the system are also given in [71]. These scenarios are summarized in Table 4.
In this paper, we have selected the scenario entitled ‘Heart-attack 1’ from the use
cases (Table 4) as our running example:
Ms. Annette Becker is eighty-five years old. She is prone to heart failures; hence
the hospital has installed a smart Home Care System (HCS) at her house. Suddenly, as
she walks out of the kitchen, she stumbles, falls down and cannot get up. In real time,
her health bracelet sends information, such that heart beat and skin temperature, to
the HCS. The system analyzes the images captured on the video monitoring system
and gets an updated medical profile of the patient from the hospital. By combining all
the different pieces of information, the system infers that it is a medium emergency
situation. In such a case, the emergency calls list specifies Annette’s neighbors as
primary contact. The HCS (via a phone communication system) sends the neighbors an
6ID Scenario Title Scenario Description
1 Heart-attack 1 HCS monitors a patient prone to heart failures and provide her
with social support
2 Loneliness HCS arranges a birthday party for a lonely senior citizen
3 Isolation Sending reminders to family members to call their elderly relatives
during occasions
4 Finances Financial support from the family and legal support from an ex-
pert, arranged by HCS
5 Fever A patient with fever does not feel helpless, after talking to his
doctor and receiving the right medication
6 Medication HCS monitors patient to take her medication, and take action if
she does not
7 Weight Significant weight gain, recognized and solved by HCS
8 Depression 1 Depression, expressed through inactivity, is surpassed with the
help of WAS
9 Alzheimer Alzheimer patient finds his way home thanks to his GPS/video
capture/HCS
10 Depression 2 HCS records lower activity level and contacts a neighbor to visit
senior citizen
11 Alcoholism Alcoholism prevented by the HCS with the help of the community
12 Heart-attack 2 HCS captures patient’s heart attack danger and infers to contact
family for help
Table 1 Use Case Scenarios
SMS inquiring whether they are available to come and help; if no neighbor is available,
a friend or family member is contacted.
For Annette, being helped by people she feels connected to is important. To this
end, she is also given access to social support, such as social assistance and support
groups, that she can use to get health-related information and to which she may con-
tribute. However, the system should guarantee that no private information such as
video captures or medical data falls in mischievous hands. Therefore, the system should
be convivial but stay private.
4 Requirements Modeling
To capture stakeholders’ requirements, we adopt the SI* modeling language [36,50] as
it supports the analysis of security and dependability requirements of socio-technical
systems. SI* extends the i* framework [73] and is founded upon the concepts of actor,
goal, resource, and social relations. An actor is an active entity that has strategic goals.
A goal is a state of affairs whose realization is desired by some actor (objective), can
be realized by some (possibly different) actor (capability), or should be authorized by
some (possibly different) actor (entitlement). Entitlements, capabilities and objectives
of actors are modeled through relations own (O), provide (P) and request (R), respec-
tively. Resources are artifacts produced/consumed by goals. Goals can be refined using
AND/OR decomposition; means-end relations identify resources produced or consumed
by a goal.
Social relations are captured by the notions of trust and delegation. Trust is a
relation between two actors representing the expectation of one actor (trustor) about
the behavior of the other actor (trustee). In particular, trust of execution (Te) models
the trustor’s expectations about the ability and dependability of the trustee in achieving
a goal; and trust of permission (Tp) models the trustor’s expectations that the trustee
7does not misuse the given permission. Delegation is used to represent a formal passage
of responsibility (delegation of execution (De)) or authority (delegation of permission)
between two actors (delegator and delegatee).
As in [3], we distinguish three types of permission: access, modify, and manage. Each
type of permission determines the set of actions that an actor can perform. For instance,
if an actor has access permission on a resource, he can only use the resource. Modify
permission allows an actor to change the content of a resource. Manage permission
allows an actor delegate the permission to other actors and modify permissions of
other actors. The three types of permission, access, modify and manage, operate in a
hierarchical manner. In particular, manage permission implies modify permission, and
modify permission implies access permission. Delegation of access/modify/manage is
graphically represented by an edge with label Dpa, Dpmd and Dpma, respectively.
In socio-technical systems, an actor who has the right to achieve a goal, may dele-
gate such rights to the wrong actor. Since many actors may have the right to achieve the
goal, it is not always possible to control that an actor cannot achieve a goal. To address
this issue, we model explicit negative authorizations as in [37]. A negative authorization
expresses a denial for an actor to achieve a goal or access a resource. As for positive
authorizations, we distinguish three types of denial. Their meaning is dual to the one
of positive authorizations (the hierarchy of types of permission is also reversed). Denial
of access/modify/manage is graphically represented by an edge with label Dla, Dlmd
and Dlma, respectively. In our approach, negative authorizations take precedence over
positive ones, i.e. whenever a user has both a positive and a negative authorization on
the same goal/resource, the user is prevented to access it. Moreover, an actor can deny
permission to another actor only if he has manage permission.
Figure 2 presents the SI* model corresponding to the AAL scenario presented
in Section 3. The scenario involves five actors: Patient, Hospital, HCS, Neighbor, and
Social Support. The Patient has the intention (objective) to fulfill goal stay healthy and
is the legitimate owner of her data, while the Hospital has the capability to achieve
goal update patient record. Goals can produce or consume resources. For instance, goal
maintain patient record requires resource patient profile. The Patient relies on the HCS
to fulfill goal stay healthy. In turn, this goal is decomposed into update patient profile,
determine emergency level, and provide medical support. In order to achieve these goals,
the Patient grants access to her data to the HCS (through the Hospital). For privacy
reasons, the Patient denies access to her data to the Neighbor.
5 Access Control Policy
Access control is a security mechanism which is typically adopted for the protection
of sensitive information. An access control policy consists of rules that specify which
actions a user can or cannot perform on system resources. Hereafter, we assume that
there is a centralized access control system that enforces access control policies.
Definition 1 Let S be the set of subjects, R the set of system resources, A the set
of actions, and Π = {permit, deny} the set of rulings. An authorization rule is a 4-
tuple 〈s, a, r, τ〉 where s ∈ S, a ∈ A, r ∈ R, τ ∈ Π. A positive authorization rule
〈s, a, r, permit〉 specifies that a subject s is allowed to perform action a on resource r,
whereas a negative authorization rule 〈s, a, r, deny〉 states that a subject s is prohibited
to perform action a on resource r. An access control policy is a set of (positive and
negative) authorization rules.
8Fig. 2 SI* Model of the HotCity Ambient Assistant Living (AAL) scenario
We argue that one desideratum for the specification of access control policies is
that such policies are derived (possibly automatically) from the requirements of the
system in which they will be eventually enforced. This ensures the alignment of the
policy specification with the requirements and reduces the efforts of policy writers
making their tasks less error-prone. To this end, we adopt an approach similar to the
one proposed in [51]. First, the requirements model is analyzed using the tool in [48] to
determine whether the designed system satisfies a number of authorization, availability
and privacy properties. Such properties aim, for instance, to verify whether actors have
the necessary permissions to perform their assigned duties, and whether the elicited
permissions comply with the need-to-know principle. This guarantees that on the one
hand, the elicited authorizations are sufficient for a complete business execution, and
thus that the obtained access control policy is not too restrictive; on the other hand,
it also guarantees that actors does not have permissions they do not need. Once the
requirements model satisfies these security properties, the security elements of the
model (i.e., ownership and delegation of permission) are used to define access control
policies.
In SI*, own denotes the entitlements of actors: an actor (the owner) has full au-
thority concerning his resources. Accordingly, we assume that the owner of a resource
9Positive Authorizations
1 〈Patient,manage, patient data, permit〉
2 〈Hospital,manage, patient profile, permit〉
3 〈Hospital,manage, patient data, permit〉
4 〈HCS,manage, phone communication system, permit〉
5 〈HCS, access, patient data, permit〉
6 〈HCS, access, patient profile, permit〉
7 〈Social Support,manage, social support resources, permit〉
Negative Authorizations
8 〈Hospital, access, phone communication system, deny〉
9 〈HCS, access, social support resources, deny〉
10 〈Social Support, access, patient data, deny〉
11 〈Social Support, access, patient profile, deny〉
12 〈Social Support, access, phone communication system, deny〉
13 〈Neighbor, access, patient data, deny〉
14 〈Neighbor, access, patient profile, deny〉
15 〈Neighbor,modify, social support resources, deny〉
Table 2 Non Negotiable Authorizations for the AAL scenario
has the highest permission on the resource (i.e., manage permission). Remark that
high permissions imply lower permissions. Entitlements of actors are then propagated
through delegation of permission. In particular, an actor can delegate any type of rights
on a resource to another actor if he has manage rights. This propagation is enabled
through axioms that permit to derive authorizations from the facts obtained through
the transformation of graphical models (see [51] for details). Intuitively, authorizations
of a given actor are derived by determining the existence of a chain of delegations of
permission from the owner to that actor (possibly through goal refinement). Negative
authorizations are derived similarly by determining if the actor denying another ac-
tor to use a given resource has legitimately received manage rights from the resource
owner.
Table 2 presents the access control policy derived from the SI* model in Figure 2.
One can observe in the table that several authorizations (either positive or negative) are
not specified (e.g., no authorization on the phone communication system are defined for
the patient). Indeed, unlikely elicited requirements cover all possible cases. We assume
that the authorization decision for cases where an authorization rule is not defined, is
deny. Although this solution guarantees that the deployed access control mechanism
complies with the least privilege principle, it has the side effect that such a mechanism
may be too restrictive.
To address this issue, we distinguish between negotiable and non-negotiable autho-
rization rules. Non-negotiable authorization rules represent rigid authorizations that
cannot be modified to guarantee the security of the system. Essentially, they are strict
constraints imposed by the requirements and, therefore, they cannot be relaxed. Ac-
cordingly, the authorizations in Table 2 which are translated from requirements are
non-negotiable. Negotiable authorization rules, on the other hand, regulate situations
for which a constraint is not explicitly defined by the requirements. These rules are
derived from conviviality recommendations (Section 7). Intuitively, the distinction be-
tween non-negotiable and negotiable authorization rules resembles the distinction be-
tween hard requirements (i.e., compulsory requirements) and soft requirements (i.e.,
optional requirements) [41].
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By introducing negotiable authorization rules, we aim to increase the flexibility of
the system by highlighting the adaptable part of the authorization policy, rather than
introducing other decisions types. In other words, unlike XACML [1] which extends
binary decisions Permit and Deny with Not Applicable decision to indicate that no
policies are applicable to a given access request, we assume that the default access
decision is deny and provide the flexibility necessary to deal with requirements evolution
through negotiable authorizations.
6 Conviviality Model
Conviviality has recently been introduced into multi-agent and ambient intelligence
systems [18,21] to highlight soft qualitative requirements like the user friendliness of
systems. The concept of conviviality, originated from social science, was popularized by
a book of Illich in 1973 called “tools for conviviality”, in which he defines conviviality
as:
“individual freedom realized in personal interdependence” [40]
Interdependence and dependencies play a prominent role in many formal systems
such as, for example, Bayesian networks. In this paper, the notion of dependence is
used as it is in multi-agent systems where dependency relations relate agents who seek
to reach their goals, to other agents who have the abilities required to fulfill these goals.
Following conventions in game theory as well as multi-agent systems, we say that the
ability of an agent to fulfill goals of other agents is an indication of its social power.
A dependence network is a social network where the relations among the agents
are labeled with a goal, expressing that an agent depends on another agent for the
fulfillment of this goal. Based on the notion of social dependency introduced in [23],
dependence networks were put forward in [66], and further developed in [67]. Boella
et al. [8] show how dependence networks can be used to determine which reciprocity-
based coalitions can be formed. In [21], these coalitions represent potential interactions
among the agents, and are thus an indication of conviviality.
Conviviality can be measured by the number of reciprocity-based coalitions that can
be formed, as developed in [16]. Some coalitions, however, provide more opportunities
for their participants to cooperate with each other than other coalitions, being thereby
more convivial. For example, if a patient needs assistance from her neighbors, it is
better if she can rely on several neighbors and is able to choose among them the one(s)
with whom she already has interactions. The relation is reciprocal as they both give
to the coalition and receive from the coalition; it is more convivial.
6.1 Conviviality in Access Control
In the SI* modeling language [36,50], actors are endowed with intentionality from the
early phases of the system development process. This allows for a profound under-
standing of the environment and of the interactions between stakeholders.
SI* uses the concepts of entitlement, objective, and capability to distinguish be-
tween actors who want access to a resource or the fulfillment of a goal, from actors who
have the capabilities to provide a resource or fulfill a goal, and actors who are entitled
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to do any of the above. Entitlements and their delegation are the basis for the speci-
fication of the access control policies of the system. In particular, the entitlements of
actors are mapped into positive and negative authorization rules which specify whether
an actor is allowed or denied to access data and IT resources, and thus to fulfill its
goal.
Stakeholders may not have the capabilities to fulfill their objectives. The social
relation of delegation is used in SI* to represent a formal passage of responsibility
between two actors, namely the delegator and the delegatee. More specifically, SI*
uses delegation of execution to represent that an agent delegates to another agent
the fulfillment of an objective, thereby creating a dependency between the two agents
in relation to the objective. For example, in the SI* model of the HotCity Ambient
Assistant Living scenario illustrated in Figure 2, the patient delegates to the HCS the
execution of its goal stay healthy, which, in effect, makes the patient dependent on the
HCS for that very same goal. We therefore use the concept of delegation of execution
to build a bridge between conviviality and access control.
6.2 Dependence Networks
We now introduce our definition of dependence networks. Note that in our model, the
dependencies are among the agents, so if an agent a depends on a distinct agent b for
an action, a resource or a plan to achieve its goal g, the dependency of agent a towards
agent b will be on g. Goals are considered the reasons for which the dependencies
arise. Abstracting away from the actions, resources and plans of the agents, we define
a dependence network as follows:
Definition 2 A dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 where: A is a set of
agents, G is a set of goals, dep : A × A → 2G is a function that relates with each
pair of agents, the sets of goals on which the first agent depends on the second, and
≥: A → 2G × 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on sets of goals occurring in his
dependencies: G1 ≥ (a)G2.
In our model, the dependencies in the dependence network correspond to the del-
egations of execution in the SI* model, which account for goal refinement as some
delegated goals are subgoals of other delegated goals.
Returning to our scenario, consider the dependence network DN = 〈A,G, dep,≥〉
corresponding to the SI* model introduced in Section 4:
– Agents A = {P,H,HCS,N, S}, respectively: patient, hospital, HCS, neighbor, and
social support; Goals G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}.
– dep(P,HCS) = {g1}: agent P depends on agent HCS to achieve goals {g1}, stay
healthy ;
dep(HCS,H) = {g2}: agent HCS depends on agent H to achieve goals {g2}, update
patient profile;
dep(H,HCS) = {g3}: agent H depends on agent HCS to achieve goals {g3}, get
real-time data;
dep(HCS,N) = {g4}: agent HCS depends on agent N to achieve goals {g4},
provide first aid ;
dep(P, S) = {g5}: agent P depends on agent S to achieve its goals {g5}, provide
social support ;
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dep(S, P ) = {g6}: agent S depends on agent P to achieve its goals {g6}, get patient
participation.
– Agent P prefers to stay healthy than to get social support: {g5} >(P ) {g6}
The graphical representation of the dependence network is illustrated in Figure 3.
The figure should be read as follows: the five agents are represented by the nodes in the
graph, and the dependencies among them are indicated by labeled arrows. The label
indicates the goal on which the dependency is based. For example, the patient depends
on its Home Care System to stay healthy.
Fig. 3 Dependence Network DN
In socio-technical systems, agents are involved with each other and may support
each others’ goals if an agent is not able to achieve them by itself. Dependence net-
works and coalitional game theories can be used to define potential reciprocity-based
coalitions, which are sets of agents together with a subset of the dependencies for these
agents, such that each agent contributes something and receives something from the
coalition. Based on [9], we define a coalition as follows:
Definition 3 Let A be a set of agents and G be a set of goals. A coalition function is
a partial function C : A×2A×2G such that {a | C(a,B,G)} = {b | b ∈ B,C(a,B,G)},
the set of agents profiting from the coalition is the set of agents contributing to it.
Let 〈A,G, dep,≥〉 be a dependence network, a coalition function C is a coalition if
∃a ∈ A,B ⊆ A,G′ ⊆ G such that C(a,B,G′) implies G′ ∈ dep(a,B).
The priority relation can be taken into account to define preferred reciprocity based
coalitions. Like conviviality, coalitions emerge from the sharing of properties and/or
behaviors whereby each member’s perception is that their personal needs are taken
care of.
In order to evaluate the conviviality in the network, we first make the following
assumptions (or hypotheses):
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H1 The cycles identified in a dependence network are considered as coalitions.1 These
coalitions are used to evaluate cooperation in the network. Cycles are the smallest
graph topology expressing interdependence, thereby cooperation, and are there-
fore considered atomic relations of interdependence. When referring to cycles, we
are implicitly signifying simple cycles, i.e., where all nodes are distinct [24]; we
also discard self-loops. Moreover, when referring to cooperation, we always refer to
potential interaction rather than to actual interaction.
H2 There is more conviviality in larger coalitions than in smaller ones. We express
this hypothesis through the following two cases. First case, a dependence network
DNi with a coalition of size n is better for conviviality than a DNj with coalition
of size m < n. For example, consider a coalition for peace in the world. The more
countries participate, the better it is. Second case, a dependence network DNi with
a coalition of size n is better for conviviality than a dependence network DNj with
two coalitions, one of size k and the other of size l, such as that k + l ≤ n, all else
being equal. This is motivated by the fact that having one large coalition eliminates
the risk of being exposed to potential competition from other coalitions, which may
be looking for the same resources.
H3 The more coalitions in the dependence network, the higher the conviviality measure
(ceteris paribus).
Our aim is to maximize cooperation in the system. Thus, our requirements are:
R1 maximize the size of the agent’s coalitions by increasing the number of agents
involved in the coalitions,
R2 maximize the number of these coalitions.
Intuitively, the goal is hence not only to have as many agents taking part in the largest
coalition(s), but also have as many coalitions among the participating agents.
Dependence cycles in the network indicate potential interactions and coalitions
among the agents. Thus, we analyze cycles and their configurations in the network.
The dependence network in Figure 3 contains two cycles which are indicative of two
potential coalitions, on the one hand among agents HCS and H, and on the other
hand among agents P and S. We indicate the two potential coalitions as follows:
C1 : {(H,HCS, g3), (HCS,H, g2)} and C2 : {(P, S, g5), (S, P, g6)}, where we write
(a, b, g1) for (a, b, {g1}).
Note that agent N does not depend on any other agent, whereas agent HCS
depends on agent N for goal g4. Hence, agent N has no incentive to satisfy agent
HCS’s goal, as it does not have any goal to reciprocate. This indicates that there may
be ways to increase the conviviality of the network, for example by including into a
coalition agents, such as agent N , which are not part of the coalition.
1 Note that the terms “cycle” and “coalition” represent two distinct realities. Keeping the
terms different is consistent to the domains they belong to: a coalition describes a set of
agents and comes from agents domains and game theory, while cycle is a graph-theoretical
term. The dependence relations among agents participating to a coalition can be analyzed
in terms of coalitions, not cycles – which would not mean anything. Furthermore, we count
the cycles in the graph; counting coalitions would be inexact, as such a term does not exist
in graph theory. Nonetheless, there exists a relation between two terms: cycles identified in a
dependence network are considered as coalitions.
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6.3 Conviviality Increase
According to Boella et al. [9], coalitions in a dependence network may be changed in the
following ways: 1) by changing the agents, e.g., by entering or leaving the system, 2) by
changing the dependencies among the agents, i.e., by adding or deleting dependencies
among the agents, 3) by introducing or changing normative dependencies, such as
obligations and prohibitions, and 4) by changing the composition of the coalitions
while the agents and dependencies remain the same.
In this paper, we assume that the set of agents within the dependence network
is given and it does not change over time. Similarly, we do not consider changes in
the composition of the coalitions within the network due to internal processes. Finally,
we do not introduce normative dependencies as, typically, policies are considered as
rules and constraints that model intended behaviors. In fact, they contrast with norms
considered as agreed policies in the sense that they are agreed to by the members of
a community. Conviviality for example, is usually considered as a social norm. Norms
apply to groups and regulate the behavior of the individuals among themselves; they
differ from policies, such as access control policies, which may also apply to single
individuals. For example, privacy policies may apply to an individual patient, and mail
filtering policies to a single doctor. Thus, among the approaches mentioned in [9], we
adopt the second approach; accordingly, a change in the network is only due to the
change of a dependency between two agents.
We recall from the previous section, the two requirements for conviviality, i.e., to
maximize the number of agents involved in coalitions (R1) and the number of coalitions
(R2). Satisfying R1 and R2 will maximize conviviality.
Consider that a need for social interactions may be inferred for the neighbor, or
directly expressed by the neighbor through a feedback loop. Such an aspiration could
be fulfilled based on distinct dependencies, i.e, agent N (i.e., the neighbor) may depend
on agent P (i.e., the patient), or on agent S (i.e., Social Support) to achieve it. As the
access to the social support of the patient is managed by the Social Support agent
itself, it is thus the Social Support agent that would have to create the dependency.
We now present the mechanism that would allow such dynamics.
6.4 Dynamic Dependence Networks
The notion of agents’ power introduced in [23] allows an agent to add dependencies
inside a network, i.e., to increase reciprocity-based coalitions, and thus conviviality.
Dynamic dependence networks proposed in [21] allow the possibility to introduce new
dependencies. We define a dynamic dependence network DDN as in [21]:
Definition 4 A dynamic dependence network is a tuple 〈A,G, dyndep,≥〉 where:
– A is a set of agents and G is a set of goals.
– dyndep : A×A×A→ 2G is a function that relates with each triple of agents the set
of goals on which the first agent depends on the second, if the third agent creates
the dependency.
– ≥: A → 2G × 2G is for each agent a total pre-order on goals which occur in his
dependencies: G1 ≥(a) G2.
Building on the dependence network DN defined in Section 6.2, consider the fol-
lowing dynamic dependence network DDN = 〈A,G, dyndep,≥〉 where:
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Fig. 4 Dynamic Dependence Network DDN with the added goal g7, in dashed line
1. A = {P,H,HCS,N, S}; G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7}, now including g7: get social
interaction.
2. Added dependency: dyndep(N,P, S) = {g7}: agent N depends on agent P to
achieve goal {g7} if it is created by agent S.2
3. Preferences on goals are as previously.
Figure 4 illustrates dynamic dependence networks DDN . The dashed arrow labeled
with goal g7 represents the new dependency in DDN . The added dependency creates
a new cycle in the network, indicating an additional potential coalitions, namely C3 :
{(N,P, g7), (P,HCS, g1), (HCS,N, g4)}. In this coalition, the three agents N,P and
HCS depend on each other to achieve their goals; agent N is no longer isolated. The
new coalition C3 ensures that the agent N satisfies goal g3 of agent HCS. The dynamic
dependence network DDN is more convivial than the dependence network DN as there
are more cycles in the graph, indicating more potential coalitions among the agents.
More dependencies may be considered to create more cycles in the network, thereby
increasing the potential interactions among the agents, and therefore the conviviality
of the system. For instance, coalition C4 : {(P,HCS, g1), (HCS, N, g4), (N,S, g7),
(S, P, g6)} could be created for instance by triggering dyndep(N, S, S) = g7. However,
no such a dependency has yet been elicited, and therefore this coalition cannot be
considered at this point.
6.5 Discussion
There is a large amount of work on how to use dependence networks, specially since
we are interested in the resolution of conflicts and regulation. Dependence networks,
firstly defined by Emerson [31], have been developed in the context of multi-agent sys-
tems by Conte and Sichman [67]. Sichman [66] presents coalition formation using a
dependence-based approach where a dependence situation allows an agent to evaluate
the susceptibility of other agents to adopt his goals. Sauro [70,62] shows how to use
dependence networks to discriminate among different potential coalitions during the
coalition formation process. He assumes that a coalition is effectively formed only when
2 Note that a dependency dep in DN can be seen as a particular case of dependency dyndep
in DDN.
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all its members agree on it and they cannot deviate from what was established in the
agreement, once they decide to enter it. Bonzon et al. [10] use dependence networks
to compute pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in a simpler way, without enumerating all
combinations of strategies. The notion of dependence between players and variables is
used to split up a game into a set of interacting smaller games, which can be solved
more or less independently. In Sauro and Villata [63], abstract and refined dependence
networks for cooperative boolean games are introduced to improve the computation
of the core. Koller and Milch [43] introduce a representation language for multi-player
games called multi-agent influence diagrams. It extends the graphical models developed
for probability distributions to a multi-agent decision-making context. Like in depen-
dence networks, these diagrams explicitly encode a structure involving the dependency
relationships among variables.
Many examples of using dependence networks can be found in software engineer-
ing. For instance, the i* modeling language [73] and the Tropos software engineering
methodology [12] represent the network of dependency relationships among the actors
to analyze the organizational setting in which the system-to-be operates. In particular,
their notation allows the description of the structural aspects of the early requirements
model, in terms of relationships and dependencies among actors. These frameworks
have been extended to describe also how the network of dependencies evolves over
time and the circumstances under which a given dependency arises and can be spec-
ified, as well as the conditions that permit to consider the dependence to be fulfilled
[35,52].
One of the main advantages of dependence networks is that they can be rewritten
as power structures: a (social) dependency of agent d on agent p for reason e can be
conceptualized as the (social) power of agent p over agent d for the reason e. Moreover,
the distinction between reciprocal and mutual dependencies [68] involves the devel-
opment of a social reasoning mechanism that analyzes the possibilities to differently
profit from reciprocal than from mutual dependencies.
Efficiency and stability metrics are commonly used to evaluate coalitions. The
former giving an assurance on the economical gain reached by being in the coalition,
the later giving a certainty that the coalition is viable on the long term. Therefore, the
positive evaluation of a coalition against these two metrics is often considered to be a
prerequisite for the coalition formation. However, depending on the application domain,
other functional and non-functional requirements, e.g., security, user-friendliness or
conviviality, may play an important role in the choice of a coalition. Requirements
may be considered in a trade-off at the same level as efficiency and stability, or as a
further filtering criterion, to select among otherwise efficient and stable coalitions.
We do not introduce temporality in our cooperation measures as they aim to assess
the conviviality of the system at design time. In particular, cooperation measures quan-
tify interdependence in social relations, representing the degree to which the system
facilitates social interactions. Intuitively, more interdependence increases cooperation
among groups of agents or coalitions, whereas larger coalitions may decrease the effi-
ciency or stability of these involved coalitions. In contrast, run-time evaluation would
require the use of temporal dependence networks as the ones proposed in [17,20] which
analyze the evolution of cooperation over time.
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Fig. 5 Dependence Network and Access Control Ontologies
7 Access Control Policy Update
The analysis of the dependence network may lead to consider some potential coalitions
and mutual dependencies between agents in order to increase the conviviality of the
system. Those potential dependencies may require granting additional authorizations to
agents. This, however, may compromise the security of the system. Therefore, we need
to analyze the impact of potential dependencies on the existing access control policy.
This section describes how potential dependencies captured through the analysis of
the dependence network are used to adapt the access control policy regulating the
overall system. First, we discuss the semantic gap between the ontology related to
access control and the ontology related to dependence networks. Then, we present our
approach to bridge such a gap. Finally, we present a strategy for policy update based
on the distinction between negotiable and non-negotiable authorization rules.
7.1 Semantic Gap between Access Control Paradigm and Conviviality Paradigm
We use ontologies to represent access control concepts as well as dependence network
concepts. An ontology defines a formal representation of the concepts and relationships
between those concepts in a particular domain [65]. Figure 5 illustrates the ontology
related to access control (left) and the one related to dependence networks (right), both
visualized using NeOn toolkit [54]. In the access control ontology, authorization rule is
modeled as a subclass of class access control policy; classes subject, action, resource, and
ruling are modeled as subclasses of class authorization rule. Rulings permit or deny are
modeled as individuals (i.e., instances). In the dependence network ontology, classes
goal and agent are subclasses of class dependence network; the depender and dependee
are modeled as individuals which are related by object property depends on.
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As shown in Figure 5, access control is shaped by the notions of subject, resource,
action and ruling. Those concepts, however, do not appear in the dependence network
ontology. Therefore, adapting an access control policy on the basis of dependency rela-
tions between agents requires closing the semantic gap between these two ontologies. In
the remainder of the section, we discuss how to create a mapping between dependence
network concepts and access control concepts to narrow the semantic gap between the
two paradigms.
7.2 Mapping Between Access Control Policy and Dependence Networks
Potential dependencies are built upon the achievement of a specific goal between a
depender and a dependee. To be able to analyze the impact of such dependencies on
the existing access control policy, it is necessary to determine which authorization rules
an agent needs in order to carry out the assigned duties (i.e., to fulfill the delegated
goal). To bridge the gap between dependence networks and access control, we propose
to map each goal in the dependence network to the set of actions and resources that
are required to fulfill the goal. This mapping is illustrated by a socio-technical mapping
matrix defined as follows.
Definition 5 A socio-technical mapping matrix is a n×m matrix where rows denote
pairs (resource, action), and columns denote goals.
The socio-technical mapping matrix shows, for each goal in the dependence network,
which resources are needed for the achievement of the goal together with the actions
(i.e., access, modify and manage) that can be performed on such resources. The link
between resource and goals is derived from the SI* model through AND/OR refine-
ment and delegations of execution (Section 2) using the approach presented in [51].
Intuitively, if a resource is linked to the goal (via a means-end relation), then the re-
source is needed for the achievement of the goal. If a goal is decomposed into subgoals,
each subgoal is iteratively analyzed. In particular, resources linked to a subgoal are
needed for the achievement of the upper level goals.3 If a (sub)goal is delegated to
another actors, the corresponding goal model rooted in the rationale of the delegator
is analyzed as described above. Thus, the set of resources needed to achieve a goal in-
cludes all resources needed for the achievement of its subgoals possibly via delegation.
The actions to be performed on these resources (i.e., access, modify, manage) are de-
rived by the analysis of the goals for which the resource is directly linked. For instance,
goal maintain patient profile in Figure 2 (and thus goal update patient profile) requires
‘modify’ rights on the patient profile. Goal elicited through the dependence network
to increase the conviviality of the system (e.g., get social interaction in our scenario)
are analyzed in similar way. For instance, the analysis of goal get social interaction
shows that its achievement requires ‘access’ rights for social support resources. In this
work, we rely on the tool presented in [48], which implements the approach in [51], to
automatically infer the list of resources needed to achieve a goal.
Table 3 presents the socio-technical mapping matrix for our scenario. In the ta-
ble, “+” is used to represent that executing a certain action on a certain resource is
3 Note that OR decomposition may lead to alternative sets of resources that may be needed





















Patient data Access + + + + NA NA NA
Modify NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Manage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Patient Access + + NA NA NA NA NA
profile Modify + + NA NA NA NA NA
Manage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Phone Access + NA NA NA NA NA NA
communication Modify NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
system Manage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Social Access NA NA NA NA + + +
support Modify NA NA NA NA + + NA
resources Manage NA NA NA NA NA NA NA
Table 3 Socio-technical mapping matrix
necessary to achieve the goal, and NA (i.e., not applicable) to represent that a certain
resource (or an action) is not needed for the achievement of the goal.
The analysis of the dependence network may lead to consider potential dependen-
cies between agents to improve the conviviality of the system. However, the impact
of such dependencies on the system security should be analyzed. Indeed, dependencies
cannot be deployed in the system if they lead to security breaches. To assess the impact
of a potential dependency on the access control policy, we identify which authorization
rules are needed to achieve the delegated goal using the socio-technical mapping matrix.
We refer to those authorizations as candidate authorization rules, denoted by ca. Given
a potential dependency dep(a, b, s) where a is the depender, b the dependee, and s is
the agent creating the dependency, the corresponding set of candidate authorization
rules ca(dep(a, b, s)) is identified as follows:
– For each g such that {g ∈ G|G = dep(a, b, s)}, the pairs (resource, action) needed
for achievement of g are determined through the socio-technical mapping matrix.
– Each identified pair (resource, action) is augmented with the dependee b. The
resulting set forms the set of candidate authorization rules.
Thus, we resort to the socio-technical mapping matrix to identify the candidate
authorization rules needed to carry out the duties assigned through a given potential
dependency. For example, in the dependence network of Figure 4, goal get social in-
teraction involves a depender Neighbor and a dependee Patient. Through the mapping
matrix, the goal is mapped to resource social support resources and action access. Ac-
cordingly, deploying the dependency within the system, while ensuring that the goal
can be achieved, requires updating the access control policy with the following autho-
rization rule:
〈Patient, access, social support resources, permit〉
Once the candidate authorization rules are identified, the security expert should
evaluate them against the current access control policy. In particular, the access con-
trol policy is updated only if candidate authorization rules do not conflict with non-
negotiable authorization rules (see Section 5). In the next section, we present a strategy




To evaluate whether a policy update is eligible, candidate authorization rules should
be evaluated against negotiable and non-negotiable authorization rules. To not violate
the security constraints, the following strategy is followed to update the policy:
Case 1 (No Conflict): If all candidate authorization rules related to a potential depen-
dency correspond to negotiable authorization rules, then the potential dependency
is deployed in the system and the policy is updated by including the candidate
authorization rules.
Case 2 (Conflict): If there exists a candidate authorization rule related to a poten-
tial dependency which is in conflict with a non-negotiable authorization rule (i.e.,
the two rules have a different ruling), then the potential dependency is rejected.
Conviviality is not increased; however, the system remains secure.
Case 3 (Neutral): If a potential dependency does not require updating the access con-
trol policy, then the potential dependency is deployed in the system. Conviviality
is increased, and the access control policy remains unchanged. The system remains
secure since the deployed dependency has no impact on the security policy.
In the next section, we present the application of policy update to our AAL sce-
narios.
8 Validation
In this paper, we propose a methodological framework for updating and adapting ac-
cess control policies based on conviviality recommendations. To validate our approach,
we have applied it to the Ambient Assistant Living (AAL) domain and in particular
to a number of scenarios which have been emphasized by our partner Luxembourg
HotCity. The aim of the validation is to verify whether our methodology improves the
conviviality of the system (thus the user experience), while maintaining an appropriate
level of security. This section first describes two validation scenarios and the prototype
implementation of the running example. These descriptions are followed by a presen-
tation of the results in Section 8.3 and by a discussion on the threats to validity in
Section 8.4.
8.1 Validation Scenarios
The methodology presented in this paper has been applied to a selection of twelve
scenarios. The reader may refer to a technical report [71] for more details concerning
the different scenarios besides the authorization rules and the dependence networks
related to each scenario. This selection was done by the HotCity experts based on the
following two criteria: 1) likelihood, i.e., the probability that the scenario occurs and
2) impact, i.e., the consequence on human life of the failure of the scenario. Here, we
just detail two of them, and present the results of the others in Section 8.3.
The two selected scenarios illustrate how the system is adapted given a new depen-
dency. Each scenario has been modeled with a dependence network. Later, we consider
the models to infer the potential goals and dependencies that may be added to increase
the number of cycles in the network, i.e., conviviality. For each potential dependency,
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Fig. 6 Dependence Network of Scenario 2: Depression 1
we used socio-technical mapping matrices to infer the changes to the authorization
policies governing the scenarios.
8.1.1 Scenario 1: Heart Attack 1
This scenario, which is the running example, has been presented in the dependence net-
work of Figure 3. In this scenario, the neighbor is isolated and does not depend on any
another agent in the system. The neighbor may have a potential dependency with the
patient, Annette Becker, to get a social interaction like presented in Figure 3. Such a de-
pendency is mapped to authorization rule 〈Patient, access, social support resources, permit〉
through the socio-technical mapping matrix in Table 3. Indeed, the fulfillment of goal
get social interaction requires access to social support resources. Since there are no
hard requirements conflicting with this authorization rule, the rule is added to the
authorization policy as negotiable rule (see Case 1 in the previous section). Thus, the
conviviality of the system is increased, while the system still complies with the elicited
security requirements.
8.1.2 Scenario 2: Depression 1
In this scenario, Donald is a 32 years old salesman who lives alone and has no social
activity besides his job. The scenario is illustrated by the dependence network of Fig-
ure 6. Donald depends on the Welfare Assistance System (WAS) of the local hospital for
goal prevent depression. In turn, the WAS depends on Donald to have his preferences
concerning social activities he enjoys and his availability. In addition, other patients,
namely Norman, Stan and Bob, depend on the WAS for organizing social activities.
The WAS uses a scheduling system to organize social activities for patients.
The policy that regulates the scenario includes a number of non-negotiable autho-
rization rules regulating the access to the scheduling system and patients’ preferences:
R1: 〈WAS,manage, scheduling system, permit〉
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R2: 〈Donald, access, scheduling system, deny〉
R3: 〈Norman, access, scheduling system, deny〉
R4: 〈Stan, access, scheduling system, deny〉
R5: 〈Bob, access, scheduling system, deny〉
R6: 〈Donald,manage,Donald-preferences, permit〉
R7: 〈WAS, access,Donald-preferences, permit〉
R8: 〈Norman, access,Donald-preferences, deny〉
R9: 〈Stan, access,Donald-preferences, deny〉
R10: 〈Bob, access,Donald-preferences, deny〉
To tackle Donald’s issues, the WAS aims to synchronize Donald with other patients
that have common interests. As Donald expressed interest in playing basketball, a
new dependency between him and other patients who also enjoy playing basketball is
suggested. These candidate dependencies are denoted with a dashed line in Figure 6.
The deployment of these dependencies have no impact on the access control policy.
Indeed, activities are directly organized by the WAS; thus, patients are not required to
have access to the scheduling system or to the preferences of other patients. Therefore,
the identified candidate dependencies can be deployed in the system, increasing the
conviviality of the system while the system remains secure (Case 3 ).
8.2 Implementation
In this section, we present the prototype implementation of our running example sce-
nario. In order to clearly separate the different levels of details, the set of equipment
deployed in the house is referred to as Home Care System (HCS). Such an equipment
includes actuators, sensors and a controller, Sensors collect information about patient
health status. For instance, patients are provided with a watch measuring temperature
and pulse rate. The central component of the HCS is the Home Controller (HC). This
component is the operation center of the HCS. It is connected to sensors and actu-
ators and makes computations on collected data. Its prototype implementation uses
Kevoree as an environment for both design and runtime. Kevoree4, developed by the
Triskell team at University of Rennes 1, makes use of a component-based approach and
Models@Runtime to provide a highly dynamic environment.
The HC is composed of several components in charge of the gathering of patient
information from sensors, actuators and services surrounding them and their process-
ing. Amongst these components, the BodySensors component collects information from
the watch; the VideoRecorder grabs pictures of the scene in case of need; the TextMes-
sageModem sends text messages through a GSM modem. The Patient Health Record
(PHR) component makes the link with the Electronic Emergency Responder [39] of
the local hospital and gets updates of the patient record. The Emergency Call List
(ECL) stores the name and phone number of the persons to be contacted in case of
emergency as defined by DR44 of [39]. The Workflow Manager (WM) is responsible of
orchestrating the emergency process. In particular, this component takes care of the
execution of the sequence of tasks to be executed when an event occurs.
Figure 7 presents the sequence diagram describing the steps executed by the WM.
The process is initialized by the BodySensors component when it receives an alert of
4 http://www.kevoree.org
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Fig. 7 Scenario Sequence Diagram
a fall along with the data collected by the watch such as temperature and pulse rate.
The fall is considered an emergency case; how serious this case is must be evaluated
by the HC. To this end, the alert automatically triggers the execution of the WM
component. The first step is to confirm the fall using another source of information. The
VideoRecorder component collects and processes images captured by video cameras in
the house. Once such information has been gathered, the HC can confirm the fall, and
resumes the execution of the workflow. The HC needs to collect health information
about the patient in order to decide whether the situation is a low, a medium or a high
level emergency.
Patients’ health information is requested by the PHR to the Electronic Emergency
Responder of the local hospital. The data collected are the clinical summary (DR02)
and decision support data (DR17) as described in [39]. By compiling all the information
collected, the HC makes the decision about the level of emergency.
In case of a medium emergency, the HC has to find someone who can provide
assistance to the patient. To this end, the workflow activates the ECL component. The
ECL provides the HC with the list of names and phone numbers of people trusted
by the patient (family, friends, etc.). The HC contacts each number by sending a text
message inquiring their availability in the defined order until someone accepts to assist
the patient. The first contact that answers positively receives another text message
containing the door access code to enter the flat.
The security of the process is managed by the Access Control Manager (ACM).
This component is able to reason about the current state of the HC thanks to the
Models@Runtime capabilities of Kevoree. Consequently, it works at a higher level of
abstraction than the other components and is not visible to them. The ACM ensures
that access control policies are properly enforced; it also implements the policy update
presented in Section 7. If changes in the HC are detected (e.g., a person is added/re-
moved to the ECL of a patient), the ACM assists operators in the analysis of the
conviviality of the updated system. Based on the changes, potential ameliorations can
be proposed. Such ameliorations are verified against the access control policy and in
particular against non-negotiable authorization rules. If no hard constraints have been
violated, the policy is updated and the ACM requests Kevoree to actually adapt the
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Convi- Convi
ID Scenario title L I P = L× I viality viality
before after
1 Heart-attack 1 2.5 3 7.5 2 3
2 Loneliness 3 2 6 4 5
3 Isolation 2 3 6 2 5
4 Finances 2 3 6 3 6
5 Fever 3 2 6 3 5
6 Medication 3 1 3 1 3
7 Weight 3 1 3 1 3
8 Depression 1 3 1 3 4 4
9 Alzheimer 2 1 2 2 5
10 Depression 2 1 2 2 3 5
11 Alcoholism 1 2 2 3 4
12 Heart-attack 2 1 1 1 5 7
Table 4 Prioritization of the scenarios, based on Likelihood and Impact
running system to fit the newly created policy. Accordingly, Kevoree may connect (or
disconnect) components to the HC to conform with the updated access control policy.
8.3 Results
This section summarizes the results of our methodology with respect to the 12 scenarios
selected by HotCity (Table 4). As in risk based testing approaches [34], likelihood and
impact have been used to prioritize scenarios, from low (value 1) to high (value 3). The
priority P of each scenario is calculated as the product of likelihood L and impact I,
i.e. P = L × I. The results describe the relevancy of our scenarios. Table 4 presents
the results of this ranking in a descending order in terms of Priority. ID identifies the
scenarios that are considered in the validation. Conviviality is measured by the number
of cycles in the dependence network. The result shows that, in the worst case, we have
not been able to improve the conviviality adding at least one cycle to the network,
thereby one potential coalition among the participating agents. However, we managed
to increase the conviviality with our approach in 91.6% of the selected scenarios, with
sometimes major improvements (of factor 3). Consequently, it appears that by just
combining the social dimension, i.e., conviviality, and access control policy may bring
improvements regarding how users perceive the system. This means that conviviality
may be effortlessly improved without degrading the security of the system. Indeed, we
have only considered changes that do not affect non-negotiable authorization rules. The
added-value of our approach is to make explicit decisions that were previously taken
in an ad-hoc manner by considering social and security aspects while reconsidering the
system design.
8.4 Threats to validity
During this work, we have have identified potential threats to the validity of the pro-
posed approach and its validation. This section lists some of those threats. As a threat
to internal validity, we can assume that the methodology we propose requires an expert
to manually check for conviviality improvement. We need to go beyond a methodology
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definition and find a systematic approach to allow automated self improvement of the
system’s conviviality while keeping in mind the security policy.
The threats to external validity are related to the level to which our scenarios are
representative of real life case studies. The scenarios that we have considered to validate
the approach were quite simple in terms of number of actors or goals. In the future, we
intend to improve the validation process using more elaborated scenarios with more
goals, and more actors, to show the effectiveness of our approach to achieve scalability.
9 Related Work
This work spans four main research areas, namely assistance in policy specification, pol-
icy adaptation, requirements negotiation and conviviality. In the domain of assistance
in policy specification, some contributions have been proposed to fill the gap between
requirements analysis and polices specification. Basin et al. [4] present a UML-based
modeling language, called SecureUML, for modeling access control policies and inte-
grating these (policies) into a model-driven software development process. Dardenne
et al. [28] propose a process for refining requirements and derive security policies from
them. In particular, the refinement process allows the derivation of access control poli-
cies and obligations expressed in Ponder [27]. Another work in the same direction
has been presented by Crook et al. [25] who propose a framework for defining access
control policies which considers the assignment of users to the roles within an organi-
zation. These proposals, however, focus on the system-to-be, and do not analyze the
organizational environment in which the system will eventually operate. In particular,
they do not consider the social relations between stakeholders which are the basis for
specifying conviviality-driven access control policies. Massacci et al. [46,47] present a
quantitative approach to determine the access control policy for an inter-organizational
business process, which is minimal with respect to the sensitivity of data and the level
of trust between actors. This approach allows users to express their preferences in the
form of privacy penalties associated to personal data and to the partner of the business
process. Then, it determines the alternative with the smallest privacy penalty and thus
guarantees maximal privacy protection. In contrast, our work mainly focuses on the
trade-off between conviviality and security, where the number and size of coalitions is
the main criterion to evaluate the conviviality of the system and access control policies
comply with the need-to-know principle by construction.
Several research efforts have addressed policy adaptation in dynamic environments.
Rinderle-Ma and Reichert [57] propose a formal framework for modeling changes in the
organizational models and in the corresponding access control policy. Bertino et al. [6]
present a model in which users can dynamically change their access requests to obtain
authorizations. Requests include service parameters and subject partial identities to es-
tablish trust using trust negotiation. Ray [55] proposes concurrency control algorithms
to allow real-time and concurrent policy updates in a database system. Ryutov et al.
[59] propose a framework to support policy adaptation based on suspicion level and
system threat level. Lymberopoulus et al. [45] present a framework for policy specifi-
cation and management in network services. In their framework, policies adaptation is
monitored by event triggers that allow the change of a policy on the basis of the changes
in the managed environment. Morin et al. [53] introduce a model-based approaches to
update the architecture model according to security policy. Here, a domain specific
modeling language is used to establish a mapping between the access control policy
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and the architecture model. Research efforts on policy adaptation can be categorized
based on the nature of adaptation and changes; to the best of our knowledge, our work
is the first work that considers dependence relations between agents to update access
control policies.
In the domain of requirements negotiation and trade-offs, Boehm and Egyed [7]
present a process that permits to capture, analyze and negotiate requirements in or-
der to satisfy the higher number of stakeholders. Kazman et al. [42] propose a spiral
model of design to help identify and understand the trade-offs inherent in the architec-
tures of systems that contain competing quality attributes. Their methodology helps
identify dependencies among different attributes (trade-off points) and permits rea-
soning about them. Several research initiatives [2,11,26,32,33,38,61,72] have tackled
trade-offs issues between security and social dimensions of socio-technical systems and
in particular the trade-off between security and usability. For instance, Yee [72] has
proposed to align security and usability by considering users’ workflow and deriving
authorizations from users’ tasks. Braz et al. [11] explore trade-offs between security
and usability through usability inspection methods based on automata machines the-
ory. The method provides criteria for studying usability factors which are refined into
usability metrics for a secure system. Flechais et al. [32,33] propose a methodology
supported by well defined semantics that considers security, risk analysis and the con-
text of use at design phase of a software development to achieve a trade-off between
security and usability. The approach is based on an asset model that is extended with
contextual information about the system usability. Our work is orthogonal to those
proposals in the fact that we study the trade-off between security and another social
dimension of socio-technical systems, namely conviviality.
Similarly to our work, the work by Liu et al. [44] and subsequent work by Elahi et
al. [29,30] extend i* to capture security and privacy requirements and enable trade-off
analysis between security and other non-functional requirements. Intuitively, security
is treated as a non-functional requirement: softgoals, as “Security” or “Privacy”, are
used to model the corresponding notions. In addition, an attacker model is constructed
within the requirements model, and dependency analysis is used to determine the level
of security guaranteed by the system by analyzing the satisfaction of the correspond-
ing softgoals. Although this approach makes it possible to assess the risk of security
incidents and evaluate the impact of countermeasures on the systems, it is not suitable
to derive an access control policy from the requirements model. Bryl et al. [13] propose
a requirements analysis approach for socio-technical systems which employs planning
techniques for exploring the space of requirements alternatives and a number of social
criteria for their evaluation. This approach has also been applied to SI* to select the
optimal security design among a set of alternatives [14]. The plan obtained using the
approach in [13,14] are optimal with respect to the length of the plan, where optimality
is defined in terms of length minimization. This approach, however, is not applicable to
conviviality since the plan with minimal length is usually not the one that maximizes
conviviality. Bryl et al. [13] also propose metrics to study the criticality of an actor in a
plan. Our approach would benefit from the application of such metrics to dependence
networks as they provide insights on the resilience of dependence networks.
Conviviality has been introduced as a social concept in multi-agent systems that
reflects relations between individuals to emphasize some human aspects like equality
and community life [22]. In previous studies (e.g., [16]) conviviality is measured in
terms of interdependencies between agents. The basis idea is that more opportunities
to work with other people increases the conviviality, whereas larger coalitions may de-
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crease the efficiency and stability of these coalitions. Our work considers conviviality
from a different perspective: conviviality can be increased as long as it does not impact
the system security. Conviviality has been captured through three models using de-
pendence networks [19]: the first model captures temporal properties to reason about
conviviality evolution over time; the second model captures stakeholders viewpoints;
and the third model captures transformations of social dependencies by hiding power
relations and social structures to facilitate social interactions. In our work, we do not
consider the temporal dimension that may regulate agents’ dependencies; this aspect
will be investigated in future work.
10 Conclusions and Future Work
Changes in socio-technical requirements, design, and environment may require to adapt
and update the access control policy regulating the system. This paper presents the
DN-AC alignment methodology for analyzing access control policies with respect to
the concept of conviviality. We have used a goal-oriented methodology to capture and
analyze the social interactions between stakeholders. Then, security interactions are
used to define the access control policy, whereas dependencies are used to analyze,
through dependence networks, the conviviality of the system. To reconcile the security
and conviviality visions, we proposed a socio-technical mapping matrix that connects
concepts of access control and concepts related to dependence networks to analyze the
impact of conviviality on existing authorization rules. We also defined how to adapt
authorization rules based on the impact of conviviality on the system security. To
validate the proposed methodology, we have built a proof-of-concept prototype from
the AAL use case of Luxembourg HotCity. The main lesson learned from the scenario
is that the outcome of our methodology leads to create more coalitions between agents
and thus to increase the conviviality while maintaining the security level of the system.
Further works involve refining the process of automatic derivation of dependence
networks and AC policy from requirements. This will enable to systematically analyze
complex scenarios involving a large number of agents and dependencies. Moreover, in
this paper we consider static models, whereas investigating the evolution of models
would provide finer-grained analysis over the conviviality improvement and AC policy
updating process. Finally, we need to implement a prototype of the mapping approach
to automate the process of policy update while considering the potential dependencies
in the system with the objective to improve conviviality. This automation is needed to
provide security experts with an automatic reasoning tool for policy update.
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